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ABSTRACT: The mandatory adoption of IFRS by many countries worldwide fuels the 
expectation that financial accounting information might become more comparable across 
countries.  This expectation is opposed to an alternative view that stresses the importance 
of incentives in shaping accounting information.  We provide early evidence on this 
debate by investigating the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of 
financial accounting information around the world.  Using two comparability proxies 
based on De Franco et al. [2011], our results suggest that the overall comparability effect 
of mandatory IFRS adoption is marginal at best.  To investigate the reasons for this 
finding, we first hand-collect data on IFRS compliance for a sample of German and 
Italian firms and find that firm-, region-, and country-level incentives systematically 
shape accounting compliance.  We then use the identified compliance incentives to 
explain the variance in the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption and find it to 
vary systematically with firm-level incentives, suggesting that only firms with high 
compliance incentives experience substantial increases in comparability. 
Keywords: international accounting, IFRS, comparability, accounting harmonization, 
financial accounting compliance, reporting incentives 
JEL Classification: M41, G14, F42 
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1. Introduction 
The mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 
European listed firms in 2005, accompanied by similar regulatory action worldwide, 
represents one of the most influential accounting rule changes in history.  The switch 
from a diverse set of domestic GAAPs to a single common set of accounting standards 
affects thousands of companies that differ in terms of size, ownership structure, capital 
structure, culture, legal environment, among other characteristics (Schipper [2005]).  In 
this paper we investigate whether the adoption of harmonized accounting standards has a 
material effect on the comparability of financial accounting information provided by 
firms from different institutional environments.   
European policy makers state that the reason for mandating a common set of 
accounting standards for listed companies is to “level the playing field” for participants in 
the European capital market by increasing the comparability of financial statements 
prepared by publicly traded companies across Europe (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, 
Par. 1).  The International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) similarly argues that a 
single set of high quality global accounting standards will provide financial market 
participants with comparable financial statements and thereby help them make economic 
decisions (IASC Foundation, Constitution 2(a)).  Increased cross-country comparability is 
also thought to be the main motivation behind the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) continuing support for convergence and global accounting standards (SEC, 2010) 
and its proposal to require U.S. firms to file their financial reports based on IFRS (SEC, 
2008, Hail et al. [2010], Joos and Leung [2011]).  To the extent that mandatory adoption 
of IFRS successfully levels the playing field for market participants by introducing high 
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quality accounting standards across countries, we should observe two first-order effects: 
an improvement in financial reporting quality (transparency), and an improvement in the 
cross-sectional comparability of financial accounting information (Hail et al. [2010]). 
To date, however, the majority of studies on mandatory IFRS adoption primarily 
investigates only one of the two first-order effects above, namely, changes in financial 
reporting quality (see Ahmed et al. [2010], Atwood et al. [2011], Landsman et al. 
[2011]), as well as second-order capital market consequences (see Beneish et al. [2009], 
Daske et al. [2008], Li [2010], Yu [2010]) of the IFRS mandate.  Surprisingly, little 
evidence has been produced on the other important first-order effect, that is, on changes 
in cross-country comparability of accounting information, even though financial 
reporting comparability is generally considered by policy makers and researchers alike to 
be vital to investors’ decision making and efficient asset allocation.  Thus, to our 
knowledge, our study is one of the few attempts to explicitly analyze the impact of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on the cross-country comparability of financial accounting 
information. 
We address our research question using an identification strategy that is developed in 
three stages.  First, we try to directly observe the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
the comparability of financial accounting information by using two measurement 
constructs based on the recent work by De Franco et al. [2011].  Accounting information 
can be regarded as more comparable across countries if subsequent to IFRS adoption 
firms from similar economic environments but different countries exhibit similar 
mappings of economic events into financial statements.  To identify the impact of IFRS 
adoption, we apply a variant of the standard difference-in-differences analysis (Bertrand 
 3 
et al. [2004]; Daske et al. [2008]). We construct our sample by calculating average 
comparability levels across sets of firm-pairs stemming from one industry but two 
different countries.  We assume the IFRS treatment to be heterogeneous for the resulting 
country-pair observations because the effect of IFRS on the local accounting regime of a 
given country varies systematically with the proximity of the local accounting regime to 
IFRS (Bae et al. [2008], Yu [2010]).  Based on this rationale we are able to predict 
varying IFRS treatment effects whenever at least one of the two countries that form the 
respective country-pair is switching to IFRS, while our control group contains country-
pairs where both countries did not adopt IFRS.  This heterogeneity of the IFRS treatment 
allows us to effectively control for a possible time-invariant sample selection bias in a 
“difference-in-difference-in-differences” (DDD) design (Bertrand et al. [2004]).  
Based on this research design, we find no clear evidence of the effect of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on comparability.  Our second test aims to shed light on why mandatory 
adoption of IFRS might have only a limited impact on the comparability of financial 
accounting information.  To address this question, we need a high quality firm-level 
measure of comparability.  We employ a set of hand-collected data on the IFRS 
measurement and disclosure choices of German and Italian firms to directly investigate 
the firm-, region-, and country-level determinants of measurement and disclosure 
compliance.  The adoption of IFRS can only develop an effect on accounting outcomes if 
companies comply with the new set of rules.  Lax compliance is consistent with 
managerial incentives having a predominant role in shaping accounting outcomes.  As 
managerial incentives vary both systematically and unsystematically across firms, we 
expect them to reduce the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption.  Therefore 
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our strategy is to identify different incentives for compliance with accounting standards at 
the firm, region, and country levels.  We argue that firms with high incentives to comply 
are the ones that are likely to experience more pronounced comparability effects from 
IFRS adoption. 
Using only a sub-sample of countries allows us to dive deeper into their institutional 
determinants.  Within countries institutional complementarities are important 
determinants and tend to shape reporting practices over time (Leuz [2010]).  The 
selection of Germany and Italy is motivated by the following three factors: (a) they share 
the same legal origin (code law), (b) one of them has a substantial history of voluntary 
adopters, and (c) they exhibit substantial differences in their respective domestic GAAPs 
prior to IFRS adoption.  While these two countries share the same legal regime and are of 
roughly the same economic size, and hence from a bird’s eye perspective could be 
considered rather similar, a closer look reveals significant differences.  Italy can be 
described as a relationship-based system rooted in family-run small and medium-sized 
enterprises forming pyramidal groups (Aganin and Volpin [2003]), with low levels of 
investor protection, high private benefits of control, high minority shareholder 
expropriation risk (Zingales [1994]), weak legal enforcement (La Porta et al. [1998]), 
highly concentrated ownership (Barca [1995]), strong bank orientation and 
underdeveloped equity markets (La Porta et al. [1997], Pagano et al. [1998]).  In contrast, 
over the last two decades Germany has experienced a series of economic reforms that 
have pushed the country more towards an arm’s length economic system (Leuz and 
Wüstemann [2004], Baums and Scott [2005]).  In short: these two countries are 
reasonably similar in terms of auditing and enforcement, so we can expect harmonized 
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standards to have an effect on the comparability of accounting information, but they also 
provide us with a vector of institutional differences that should give rise to heterogeneity 
in incentives. 
The results of our second test provide clear evidence that a lack of financial 
accounting comparability subsequent to IFRS adoption can be explained by domestic 
GAAP, as well as by other firm-, region-, and country-level factors.  We interpret this 
evidence as indicating that compliance incentives are important as they shape accounting 
information even within a set of countries that share a common set of accounting 
standards.  In some institutional environments, firms might just adopt the “IFRS label” 
without any serious commitment to transparency.  Because firms have considerable 
discretion in “how” they adopt IFRS, label adoption is likely to be associated with poor 
standard compliance (Daske et al. [2011]). 
Third, we use the compliance incentives identified in the second set of tests to 
investigate whether comparability effects are influenced by incentives to comply.  We 
find that high compliance incentives increase the overall comparability of financial 
accounting information as they limit the impact of the local infrastructures on 
comparability and moderate the treatment effect of mandatory IFRS adoption.  Firms 
with more incentives to comply experience systematically larger IFRS comparability 
effects.  
We conclude from our analysis that the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
accounting comparability can be expected to be marginal on average and centered on 
firms with high incentives to comply. 
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Taken together, our findings indicate that the mandatory adoption of IFRS has only a 
limited impact on the cross-country comparability of financial accounting information.  
This is consistent with Leuz [2010] who documents the existence of robust institutional 
clusters around the world.  Given complementarities among countries’ institutions, these 
clusters are likely to persist and, as a consequence, a global convergence of reporting 
practices is highly unlikely despite regulators’ efforts to harmonize accounting standards. 
We propose and test some explanations for the limited effect of mandatory IFRS adoption 
on comparability.  Studying the disclosure choices of IFRS adopting firms, we find that 
those are driven by incentives at the firm, region, and country levels. 
Our paper makes three distinct contributions to the growing body of literature that 
investigates the effects of IFRS adoption.  
First, we extend previous work that focuses on the overall first-order effects of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on transparency and comparability (Ahmed et al. [2010], 
Atwood et al. [2011], Landsman et al. [2011]) by focusing on the effect of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on the comparability of accounting information.  In particular, we 
complement and extend the findings of Lang et al. [2010] who, in a concurrent project 
that also uses the comparability measure proposed by De Franco et al. [2011], investigate 
the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on earnings comovement and accounting 
comparability.  They document a positive IFRS effect on earnings comovement and a 
negative impact on accounting comparability.  We extend their findings among three 
dimensions.  First, we use an identification strategy acknowledging that the comparability 
effect of mandatory IFRS adoption varies systematically with the local GAAP regime of 
the respective firm.  This also implies that the average comparability of firms in non-
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adopting countries will also be affected by IFRS adoption.  Second, we develop a cash 
flow-based measure of accounting comparability to avoid the problem that cross-country 
differences in the return-based comparability developed by De Franco et al. [2011] might 
be driven by changes in capital market efficiency (Holthausen, [2003]).  Third, in order to 
identify potential reasons for the overall limited comparability effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption, we also rely on hand-collected compliance data that increase the internal 
validity of our findings.  We then show that these identified compliance incentives 
systematically moderate the IFRS effect on comparability for our worldwide sample.  
Further, we extend concurrent work by Barth et al. [2011], who investigate the impact of 
IFRS adoption on the “value relevance comparability” with U.S. GAAP.  Our 
comparability measures and tests aim to capture cross-country comparability, while the 
focus of Barth et al. [2011] is on the narrower concept of comparability with U.S. firms. 
Second, we provide additional evidence on the ongoing “standards versus incentives” 
debate in the accounting literature.  Our results show that both forces shape accounting 
information simultaneously, and support the claim of prior studies that a change in 
accounting standards is not sufficient to achieve a significant shift in accounting 
outcomes. 
Third, by developing our cash flow-based comparability measure, we contribute to 
recent attempts in the literature (De Franco et. al. [2011]) to specify empirical constructs 
intended to capture cross-country comparability from the perspective of financial 
statement users.  Our accounting-based measure has the advantage to overcome the 
potential limitations that market-based comparability metrics face with cross-country 
samples. 
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a discussion of 
the related literature.  Section 3 presents our research design, sample, and results.  
Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
Comparability, together with relevance and reliability, is a key qualitative characteristic 
of accounting information.  Comparable financial statements are generally believed to 
facilitate investors’ resource allocation and investment decisions (FASB 1980, FASB 
2008, IASB 1989, IASB 2008, SEC 2000).  Capital market regulators further believe that 
a common set of accounting standards can lead to improved comparability.  The 
mandatory adoption of IFRS by European listed firms thus aims to enhance comparability 
(as well as financial reporting quality) across European countries by introducing a single 
set of high quality accounting standards (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002).   
However, while comparability of accounting information is considered of paramount 
importance for facilitating investors’ decisions and enhancing efficient asset allocation, to 
date most studies that investigate the mandatory adoption of IFRS focus on either 
changes in financial reporting quality or capital market consequences rather than on 
changes in cross-country comparability.  Studies that focus on changes in financial 
reporting quality include Ahmed et al. [2010], Atwood et al. [2011], and Landsman et al. 
[2011].  Taken together, the studies so far present an ambiguous picture about the quality 
effect of mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Among the studies that address the capital market consequences of IFRS adoption, Li 
[2010] shows that the 2005 IFRS mandate by European countries has reduced firms’ cost 
of capital only in countries with strong enforcement.  Studies that look at the effects of 
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IFRS on firms’ equity ownership include Yu [2010], who shows that the IFRS mandate 
has increased cross-border equity holdings because of the joint effect of a reduction in 
foreign investors’ information processing costs and a decrease in other barriers such as 
geographic distance, and Beneish et al. [2009] who look at the impact of IFRS on 
countries’ ability to attract foreign capital and find no discernible effect for equity 
investments while they document a positive effect on debt investments.   
An attempt to investigate the capital market consequences of IFRS adoption through 
the lens of comparability has been recently carried out by DeFond et al. [2011].  The idea 
behind their work is that if IFRS increases comparability and reduces the cost of 
comparing financial statements prepared under different GAAPs, this should positively 
affect U.S. mutual fund holdings in foreign firms.  DeFond et al. [2011] use two input-
based measures that look at the accounting standards adopted: the “GAAP heterogeneity 
measure” captures the decrease in accounting standard heterogeneity in a given industry 
as a result of IFRS adoption, and the “GAAP peer measure” computed as the ratio of the 
number of firms in a given industry using IFRS subsequent to IFRS adoption to the 
number of firms in the same industry applying local GAAP prior to IFRS introduction.  
The authors find that the benefit of increased comparability, in terms of size of mutual 
fund investments, is higher for voluntary than for mandatory adopters; further, for the 
latter, discernible effects of improved comparability only obtain in countries with serious 
implementation processes.  A related study that also uses an input-based comparability 
construct based on accounting method choice is Bradshaw et al. [2009].  The authors 
capture comparability as the difference between a firm’s accounting method choices and 
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those of its industry peers and find that firms with atypical accounting methods 
experience larger analyst forecast errors and increased forecast dispersion on average. 
Despite the growing literature on mandatory IFRS adoption, to date no published 
study has looked at the direct effect of the adoption on comparability.  A potential reason 
for this gap in the literature may be the lack of established proxies for comparability.  
Indeed, De Franco et al. [2011, p. 896] recently observe that “The term comparability in 
accounting textbooks, in regulatory pronouncements, and in academic research is 
defined in broad generalities rather than precisely.”  Rather than relying on input-based 
measures of accounting comparability that are related to standards and accounting 
method choices, De Franco et al. [2011] propose a measure of financial statement 
comparability that is firm-specific, output-based, and seeks to capture comparability from 
the perspective of financial statement users.  Their construct, labeled “financial statement 
comparability”, reflects the idea that if the same economic events are accounted for 
homogeneously by two firms (i.e., the two firms show a similar “mapping” of economic 
events into financial statements), the two firms should have comparable accounting 
systems.  Empirically, the authors proxy for economic events and the output of financial 
statements using stock returns and earnings, respectively; the more similar the mapping 
between earnings and returns across firms, the more comparable the accounting systems.   
A few working papers explicitly investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on 
accounting comparability.  Following the output-based approach proposed by De Franco 
et al. [2011], in concurrent work Barth et al. [2011] investigate whether the adoption of 
IFRS by non-U.S. firms increases the comparability of accounting information with 
respect to U.S. firms applying U.S. GAAP.  The authors operationalize comparability by 
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looking at both “accounting system comparability” and “value relevance comparability.”  
Accounting system comparability is measured as the difference between predicted stock 
returns based on U.S. GAAP and IFRS pricing multiples: the lower the difference in 
predicted returns, the higher the level of comparability.  Value relevance comparability 
looks at differences in the value relevance of earnings between U.S. GAAP and IFRS 
firms: an increase in the homogeneity of value relevance levels subsequent to IFRS 
introduction indicates higher comparability.  The authors document that following IFRS 
adoption, IFRS firms and U.S. GAAP firms exhibit higher accounting system and value 
relevance comparability although some differences still persist. 
Lang et al. [2010] use the earnings/returns approach (accounting comparability) and 
the “earnings comovement” construct (developed in a previous working paper version of 
De Franco et al. [2011] but discarded in the published version of the paper) to examine 
changes in cross-country comparability caused by the mandatory IFRS adoption and the 
effects of these changes on firms’ information environments.  They find a decrease in the 
cross-country comparability of accounting information and an increase in cross-country 
earnings comovement subsequent the IFRS mandate.  The decrease in earnings 
comovement is negatively associated with favorable properties of the firm-level 
information environment. 
Using a sample of U.K. firms, Brochet et al. [2011] document a decrease in 
information asymmetries following the introduction of IFRS and interpret this as 
evidence of an increase in the comparability of accounting information.  Wang [2011] 
looks at cross-country information transfers to capture the comparability effect of IFRS 
adoption.  She finds for the post IFRS adoption period larger information transfers 
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(proxied by market reactions by firms to earnings announcement of a foreign firm) and 
interprets this evidence as indicative of IFRS increasing comparability.  While these 
studies attempt to look at the comparability effects of IFRS adoption, they rely on 
second-order capital market consequences (i.e., changes in the information environment, 
reduction in information asymmetries, increase in information transfers) to investigate the 
first-order effect of accounting comparability.  
In sum, most of the studies on IFRS adoption focus on accounting quality issues or 
second-order capital market consequences while the evidence on the important first-order 
effect of comparability appears surprisingly scant.  Thus, to our knowledge, this is one of 
the few studies that explicitly analyze the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the 
cross-country comparability of financial accounting information with a focus on first-
order effects. Also, it is the first study that addresses the heterogeneity of the 
comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption caused by the variance of local GAAP 
regimes (Hail et al. [2010]) and investigates the cross-sectional determinants of the 
comparability effect. 
3. Empirical Analyses 
3.1 IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
This paper investigates the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on the comparability 
of financial accounting information across the world. 
Our view of accounting comparability is similar to De Franco et al. [2011].  
Financial accounting outcomes are regarded as being perfectly comparable whenever 
firms that face the same economic events provide the same financial accounting 
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information.  Firms facing similar economic events should therefore report similar 
financial accounting information while firms experiencing dissimilar economic events 
should report dissimilar financial accounting information. 
In order to identify the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on comparability, we 
follow the methodology introduced by De Franco et al. [2011].  These authors assess the 
comparability of financial accounting information by measuring the similarity of the 
earnings-return relation for subsamples of U.S. firms grouped by industry.  If firms have 
similar “mappings” of economic events (the earnings-return relation is similar), then their 
accounting should be comparable.  They use the coefficient estimates of quarterly firm-
specific time series regressions of earnings on returns to assess the degree of 
comparability.  Each regression encompasses 4 years of observations (16 quarters).  The 
coefficients of these regressions are then used to predict earnings of the investigated 
firms. In addition, the estimated coefficients of other firms within the same industry are 
used with the returns of the investigated firms to produce alternative earnings predictions 
based on the coefficients of the industry peer firms.  The smaller the average absolute 
forecast errors of these different earnings predictions, the more comparable the 
accounting earnings of the respective firm to its peers.  De Franco et al. [2011] limit the 
measure to the most comparable peers and average their measure over the last four 
calendar years, effectively basing their measure on 8 years of quarterly data.  
While De Franco et al. [2011] have the possibility to use long firm-specific time 
series of quarterly data from firms of the same institutional environment, our setting 
requires some adjustments to their methodology that are very similar to the modifications 
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applied by Lang et al. [2010].1  First of all, we use annual data as cross-country 
differences in reporting frequency and lack of quarterly data availability make the 
quarterly data approach unfeasible in our international setting; second, our post IFRS 
period is limited to four years of data; and finally, we are contrasting comparability 
effects across different countries whose markets possibly exhibit variation in information 
efficiency. 
In order to adjust our methodology accordingly, we measure the comparability of 
accounting information for a given country-industry group (based on SIC 2-digits) with 
the same industry group from other countries.  We assess the comparability separately for 
a 4-year time period prior IFRS adoption (2001-2004) and post IFRS adoption (2005-
2008).  Our sample is therefore organized by industry, country, peer-country and pre/post 
accounting regime change (additional details about the sample structure and an 
illustrative example are provided in Appendix 1). 
For each firm within a country-industry group, we estimate the following two models 
separately for the two time periods pre (last year = 2004) and post (last year = 2008) 
IFRS adoption: 
(1) iptipipiptip RETNIBE ,,,1,,0,,,,    
(2) iptipipiptip TACFOTANIBE ,,,1,,0,,,, __   , 
where p indicates the period (pre or post IFRS), i denotes the firm, t is a time indicator for 
the year, NIBE stands for net income before extraordinary items (deflated by lagged 
                                                 
1   Lang et al. [2010] provide convincing evidence indicating that their approach, which is very similar to 
ours, yields comparability measures that are consistently linked to firm-level measures of the 
information environment (analyst following, forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion, and bid ask 
spreads) in an economically meaningful way.  Also, they show that their results are similar if they rely 
on a subset of firms with quarterly data available. We provide additional tests for the identification 
quality of our measures in the results and in the additional analyses sections. 
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market capitalization), RET stands for the annual buy and hold return, NIBE_TA 
indicates net income before extraordinary items (deflated by lagged total assets) and 
CFO_TA stands for the cash flow from continuing operations (deflated by lagged total 
assets).  Resulting coefficients from estimating models (1) and (2) are truncated at the top 
1 and 99 percentiles of their distributions. 
Model (1) closely resembles the approach of De Franco et al. [2011].  As reliance on 
stable levels of market efficiency across countries and time might be problematic in a 
multi-country setting, we use an alternative modeling approach inspired by Ball and 
Shivakumar [2006] to capture the same notion of mapping of economic events while 
avoiding the potentially confounding effects of differences in market efficiency.  Model 
(2) has the advantage of capturing economic events via cash flows and therefore rules out 
any difference in market efficiency concerns.  The firm-period-level coefficients of each 
model are then used to predict earnings for the investigated firm.  In addition, the 
coefficients of each industry-peer firm (from the same and different countries) are used to 
produce alternative earnings predictions.  The absolute difference of these earnings 
predictions is averaged across country, peer-country and industry to produce our 
comparability measure: 
(3) 
 
kcjcip
ji
ipjpjpipipip
kcjcip n
RETRET
DKVCOMP
,,,
,
,1,,0,,,1,,0,,
,,,
 


, 
where DKVCOMP indicates our De Franco et al. [2011] based comparability measure 
derived from estimations of model (1), ci stands for the country of firm i, cj stands for the 
country of firm j, k stands for the two-digit industry code of firms i and j and np,ci,cj,k 
indicates the number of available firm pairs within industry k with firm i from country ci 
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and firm j from country cj and, in case of ci = cj, i ≠ j. All other variables are as 
previously defined. 
Following the same approach, we calculate our alternative cash flow-based 
comparability construct (CFCOMP) as: 
(4) 
 
kcjcip
ji
ipjpjpipipip
kcjcip n
TACFOTACFO
CFCOMP
,,,
,
,1,,0,,,1,,0,,
,,,
__ 


, 
where all variables are as previously defined.  In addition, we calculate rank-based 
measures of DKVCOMP and CFCOMP (R_DKVCOMP and R_CFCOMP) where we 
percentage-rank each absolute difference of earnings predictions for each i,j firm pair, 
separately for each period and for each firm i.  These ranks are than averaged across 
period, country, peer-country, and industry group.  Using this ranking approach we are 
able to investigate non-parametric effects of shifts in the country distributions of 
comparability pre and post IFRS adoption. 
We are using the quasi-experimental setting of mandatory IFRS adoption as our 
treatment.  In line with prior literature, we assume the treatment decision to be exogenous 
in the sense that we do not control for the potential self-selection of countries into the 
treatment group.  As our treatment is assigned at the country level our main level of 
analysis lies on the comparability effects at the country-country level meaning that we 
measure comparability at the industry-level separately for pairs of countries. 
When we try to model the determinants of comparability for a pair of countries we 
first control for country-level and industry-level determinants of comparability by 
including two-way country and industry-level fixed effects.  This controls for, e.g., 
differences in country-level institutions.  For example, a fixed effect for country A will 
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control for the effect of the enforcement system of country A that reduces the variance of 
accounting outcomes in country A.  Besides being influenced by country-level 
infrastructures we assume the comparability of accounting information between two 
countries to be influenced by the similarity of their respective GAAP regimes, meaning 
that two countries with similar GAAP regimes should have firms with more comparable 
accounting information.  Thus, our main independent variable of interest is the difference 
of accounting regimes across pairs of countries.  This strategy enables us to assess the 
effect of the IFRS treatment by modeling the change of country-country-level GAAP 
proximity caused by IFRS adoption.  While other research in the area mostly models the 
IFRS treatment as a binary variable, our identification strategy builds on the systematic 
variance of the IFRS regime shock across countries  (similar to Yu [2010]) and further 
acknowledges that the IFRS adoption should also potentially affect the cross-country 
accounting comparability of firms from non-adopting countries.  We identify the effect of 
IFRS adoption by estimating a change model that captures the effect of IFRS induced 
changes in GAAP proximity on changes in accounting comparability across time.  By 
using a change setup based on two observations pre and post we avoid the serial 
correlation problem that potentially affects difference-in-differences studies based on 
panels with longer time series  (Bertrand et al. [2004]). 
In the second set of tests, we turn our focus to the degree to which adopting firms 
comply with IFRS, and the determinants of compliance across firms and countries in 
order to identify potential firm-level variables that are likely to moderate the overall 
comparability effect.  To do so, we use a hand-collected sample of accounting 
measurement and disclosure compliance data of German and Italian IFRS adopting firms.  
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While our first set of tests is based on large cross-country samples and therefore to some 
extent sacrifices internal validity for external validity, this “boutique” sample allows us to 
measure financial accounting information and compliance with higher precision and to 
unambiguously link this information to the effect of IFRS adoption, leading to a high 
level of internal validity.  Full comparability would imply the same compliance levels 
across firms.  We therefore regard the degree of compliance as an additional dimension of 
accounting information comparability.  Using a classification instrument presented in 
Appendix 2, we find significant differences in IFRS measurement and disclosure 
compliance across German and Italian firms’ 2006 annual reports.  Since we are able to 
measure differences in incentives at the firm level, we can investigate whether firm-, 
region- and country-level incentives explain the differences in disclosure compliance that 
we document. 
The third set of tests follows a similar design to the first test, but builds on the 
identified compliance incentives from the second set of tests (size and auditor type) to 
investigate whether compliance incentives are moderating the comparability effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
3.2 SAMPLE SELECTION 
Our first and last sets of tests focus on publicly traded firms from 29 different countries 
(14 IFRS adopters and 15 non-IFRS adopters) and cover the period 2001 to 2008.  The 
sample selection starts with all firms in the Worldscope universe of countries that have 
more than 100 public firms followed by Worldscope.  From this initial sample, we delete 
all firm-year observations that correspond to voluntary IFRS adoption; all of our findings 
are thus based on mandatory adopters.  We further delete firm-year observations for 
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which returns data from Datastream are not available, or for which any other data 
necessary for estimating our comparability measures are absent.  Since our main focus 
lies on the identification of comparability effects across time, we require a balanced panel 
of firms to rule out changes in comparability across time that are caused by sample 
changes.  In addition, we require each country to have at least 50 firms with sufficient 
data.  This procedure yields a base sample of 78,784 firm-year observations to construct 
our comparability measures.  Descriptive statistics for both treatment and control samples 
can be found in Panel A of Table 1.   
[Table 1 about here] 
The base sample comprises 9,848 firms (78,784 firm-year observations).2  We estimate 
our models (1) and (2) for each firm-period in our sample, yielding a maximum of 19,690 
coefficients per model.  Based on the coefficients and the methodology discussed above 
we calculate our comparability metrics at the period, country, peer country, and industry 
level.  The resulting descriptive statistics are disclosed in Panels B and C of Table 1.3  
Throughout the analysis higher values of our measures indicate that the financial 
accounting regimes of the two respective countries for a given period and industry are 
more comparable with each other. 
Our second set of tests requires hand-collection of financial reporting and 
governance data.  Given our interest in identifying country- and firm-level determinants 
of comparability while balancing the data collection costs, we study a sub-sample of 
                                                 
2 Like in related studies, large countries such as the U.S., Japan, and the U.K. have a significant share of 
the reported sample. Excluding these countries from our analysis renders qualitatively comparable 
results (see the robustness section for more detail). 
3 Conceptually, 29 countries and 73 two-digit SIC industry groups would allow for a total of29*29*73 = 
61,393 observations for each period.  However, we require at least three firms for each country-
country-industry bin reducing the sample to 16,816 observations covering all countries and 69 
industries. 
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German and Italian firms.  The sample comprises all Italian IFRS adopters and all 
German late adopters as well as a matched sample of German firms.  The total sample 
size is 405 observations.   
3.3 BASE TEST FOR THE COMPARABILITY EFFECT OF MANDATORY IFRS 
ADOPTION 
In order to verify our identification strategy we first focus on the pre IFRS adoption 
period (2001-2004).  If our comparability measures capture differences in financial 
accounting regimes, they should be systematically linked to the proximity of GAAP 
across countries.  In order to test whether this is the case, we estimate the following 
model on the pre IFRS section of the sample: 
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where COMPM stands for the comparability measure used (either DKVCOMP, 
R_DKVCOMP, CFCOMP, or R_CFCOMP), COUNTRY is a series of ci country fixed-
effects, PCOUNTRY is a series of cj peer-country fixed effects, and INDUSTRY is a 
series of industry fixed effects.  SMCTRY is a binary variable that takes the value of one 
if ci = cj, indicating that the comparability of financial accounting regimes within one 
country is observed.4  As prior literature indicates that the financial accounting regime is 
not only influenced by accounting standards but also by other institutional factors, we 
assume that, ceteris paribus, firms from the same country show higher levels of financial 
accounting comparability.  GAAP_PROX is based on the work of Bae et al. [2008] who 
                                                 
4 In untabulated robustness checks we also include additional control variables (mean size, mean book-
to-market, standard deviation of earnings and cash flows) into our model (5). Our inferences remain 
unchanged. 
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build their GAAP proximity measure on the information available in the international 
GAAP survey study by Street [2001].  This measure captures country-pair GAAP 
distance by counting differences between two countries based on the GAAP differences 
measure presented in Bae et al. [2008: Table 1].  We define GAAP_PROX as the 
negative number of differences divided by the maximum number of differences observed 
across all country-pairs, so that larger values of GAAP_PROX indicate higher similarity 
of GAAP across countries.  We expect the coefficients of SMCTRY and GAAP_PROX 
to be significantly positive for our pre IFRS data. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The results of the respective tests are reported in Panel A of Table 2.  All reported 
coefficients show the predicted sign with six out of eight being significant at conventional 
levels.  We take this as evidence indicating that our identification strategy is sufficiently 
powerful to detect the effect of financial accounting standards on financial accounting 
comparability. 
The next test directly investigates the IFRS treatment effect on comparability, using a 
difference-in-difference-in-differences approach.  To use each country-country pair as its 
own control, we estimate the following change model: 
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where COMPM) stands for the change in the respective comparability measure (either 
DKVCOMP, R_DKVCOMP, CFCOMP, or R_CFCOMP) from the pre period to the post 
period, positive values indicating an increase in comparability.  IFRS_EFFECT captures 
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the change in GAAP_PROX caused by the adoption of IFRS in the treatment countries.5  
Since the adoption of IFRS has affected the GAAP of some treatment countries to 
become more dissimilar relative to some control countries, values of the IFRS_EFFECT 
can be negative as well as positive.  If the mandatory adoption of IFRS has had an effect 
on the international comparability of financial accounting information, we expect the 
coefficient of IFRS_EFFECT to be significantly positive.  We make no prediction for 
SMCTRY. 
As it can be assessed from Panel B of Table 2, we do not find a robust treatment 
effect of IFRS across our models.  The relevant coefficient has the predicted sign in three 
out of four cases ((R_DKVCOMP), (CFCOMP), and (R_CFCOMP)) and 
significantly so in one regression ((R_CFCOMP)).  Based on this analysis we conclude 
that the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting 
information is marginal at best.  The next set of tests investigates the determinants of 
IFRS compliance to develop some potential explanations on why the overall 
comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption might be limited. 
3.4 COMPLIANCE TESTS 
Our second series of tests investigates the cross-country determinants of accounting 
measurement and disclosure compliance.  The expected comparability effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption is based on the assumption that companies comply with the 
new set of rules.  Lax compliance is consistent with managerial incentives having a 
predominant role in shaping accounting outcomes.  As managerial incentives vary both 
                                                 
5 In untabulated robustness checks we also include additional control variables (change in mean size, 
change in mean book-to-market, change in standard deviation of earnings and cash flows) into our 
model (6). Our inferences remain unchanged. 
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systematically and unsystematically across firms, we expect them to reduce the 
comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption.  Our strategy therefore is to identify 
different incentives for compliance with accounting standards (at the firm, region and 
country levels).  We argue that firms with high incentives to comply are the ones that are 
likely to experience more pronounced comparability effects from IFRS adoption. 
Using a unique dataset on the 2006 accounting measurement and disclosure 
compliance of German and Italian firms that are publicly listed since at least 2004 and 
that adopted IFRS in 2005 (so-called “late adopters”), we first investigate whether there 
are significant differences in accounting measurement and disclosure compliance across 
countries for these firms.  To do so, we hand-collect accounting measurement and 
disclosure compliance data from the group financial reports of all firms that meet our data 
requirements (136 German and 153 Italian firms).  Financial reports for the fiscal year 
2006 are either downloaded from the respective stock exchange website or the respective 
firm investor relation website, while governance data are manually retrieved from the 
Italian market regulator’s (CONSOB) website and corporate governance reports for 
Italian firms and from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange website and financial reports for 
German firms.  From the 2006 financial reports of these firms, we hand-collect 
accounting measurement and disclosure compliance data.  To mitigate possible sample 
selection issues, we also collect compliance data from the group financial reports of 
German early adopters, so as to replicate our analysis by comparing the Italian firms with 
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a matched sample of 153 German firms (116 of which early adopters).6  Details on the 
instrument used to collect the data are presented in Appendix 2. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 presents results on accounting measurement compliance in Panel A and 
disclosure compliance in Panel B.  In Panel A, we report stated accounting measurement 
compliance separately for German late adopters, German matched firms, and Italian firms 
for the following IFRS standards: IFRS 2 (Share-based Payment), IAS 11 (Construction 
Contracts), IAS 17 (Leases), IAS 19 (Employee Benefits), IAS 36 (Impairment of 
Assets), IAS 38 (Intangible Assets), and IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement).  While we generally find the observed accounting measurement 
compliance to be similarly high across countries, we find significant differences with 
respect to IAS 38 and IAS 39, with German late adopters showing lower compliance than 
Italian firms.7   
In Panel B, we report disclosure compliance scores separately for German late 
adopters, German matched firms, and Italian firms for the same standards as in Panel A 
as well as for IAS 33 (Earnings Per Share).  Comparing the disclosure compliance scores 
with the accounting measurement compliance scores, we find that disclosure compliance 
is significantly lower than measurement compliance (this finding is in line with prior 
                                                 
6 To match German firms to similar Italian firms, we use a propensity score matching procedure and the 
following logit model: 
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7  Looking more closely at the detailed response data (not tabulated), we find that German firms tend a) 
to expense development costs, and b) not to recognize the fair value of derivative financial instruments 
on their balance sheets.  Because these non-complying measurement choices are both in line with local 
German GAAP, we conclude that some of the German late adopters “bend” IFRS rules towards local 
German GAAP.  We find a similar result for the German matched sample, although with a somewhat 
lower level of significance.  In contrast, the German matched firms exhibit a higher level of IFRS 2 
measurement compliance than Italian firms. 
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literature; see, e.g., Street and Gray [2001]).  Further, we find much more cross-country 
variance in disclosure compliance.  This variance does not lean towards one country, 
however: Italian firms exhibit significantly higher disclosure compliance for IFRS 2, IAS 
33, IAS 36 and IAS 39, while German late adopters score significantly better for IAS 17 
and IAS 38.  A comparison with the German matched sample provides similar results 
except that Italian firms’ higher scores for IAS 33 and IAS 36 are not significant and the 
German matched firms show higher disclosure compliance for IAS 11. 
Prior literature explains the overall lower level of disclosure compliance by the 
(perceived) lower level of disclosure enforcement by auditors and regulatory bodies 
(Hope [2003]).  The results on disclosure compliance for IAS 38, which indicate that 
German firms display greater compliance than Italian firms, may be due to German firms 
providing additional disclosures to compensate for lower measurement compliance (given 
their reluctance to recognize development costs).  Other observed cross-country 
differences in disclosure behavior might be explained by the tendency of firms to stick to 
established disclosure behavior based on local GAAP.  Also, when comparing German 
late adopters with Italian late adopters, one has to bear in mind that German firms faced 
lower transaction costs for early IFRS adoption.  This implies that German late adopters 
more actively self-selected into not adopting IFRS early compared to Italian firms.  As 
IFRS has been argued to demand an increase in disclosures relative to most local GAAPs 
(Daske et al. [2011]), we can expect our sample of German firms to be more reluctant to 
comply with disclosure regulations than an average German public firm.  Evidence from 
the matched sample comparison is consistent with this view. 
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We conclude from the 2006 IFRS compliance tests that, even under harmonized 
accounting standards, accounting information continues to be heterogeneous.  In 
particular, we identify some variation in accounting measurement compliance, as well as 
more pronounced variation in disclosure compliance, across countries.  When we 
examine the standard deviation of our compliance figures, we additionally find that 
disclosure compliance exhibits significant within-country dispersion.  
To investigate the within-country variance of disclosure compliance, our last test 
examines the determinants of disclosure compliance within each country.  We perform 
both a within-country and a pooled-sample analysis on our German and Italian data.  To 
construct our dependent variable, DSCORE, we average all disclosure scores for the 252 
German (136 late adopters and the 116 early adopters studied in the prior analysis) and 
153 Italian firms.  We estimate country sample and interacted pooled sample versions of 
the following disclosure compliance determinant model:8 
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where DSCORE is average disclosure compliance, calculated using the instrument 
presented in Appendix 2.  The subscripts i, and j denote firm, and industry.  
INDDUMMY is a set of first-digit SIC industry dummy variables.  TOTASS is total 
assets.  ROA, MTB, and FREQ_LOSSES are as defined before.  %INDEP_BOARD_D is 
a dummy variable for board independence that for the Italian sample is coded one if the 
                                                 
8 To address possible omitted variable concerns, we also estimated alternative versions of this model 
that included leverage, index membership, number of years since the initial public offering, seasoned 
public offerings (SPO), American Depositary Receipts (ADR), foreign listing, foreign sales, and 
analyst following as additional independent variables.  These additional variables do not change our 
inferences. 
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number of independent directors divided by the total number of board members is above 
the mean and zero otherwise, and for the German sample is coded one if the head of the 
supervisory board was not the former chief executive officer of the respective firm and 
zero otherwise.  INSTOWN is a dummy variable indicating significant institutional 
ownership (above 2%) in the firm.  GOVOWN is a dummy variable indicating whether 
an Italian governmental body has a stake in the firm.  FAMBUS is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm is controlled by a managing family.  BIG4 is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm’s financial statements have been audited by a 
dominant audit supplier (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or PWC).  LD_REGION is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the respective German (Italian firm) is domiciled in 
the eastern regions of Germany (southern regions of Italy).  EARLY is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm is an early or late IFRS adopter. 
Descriptive statistics for the potential determinants of differences in disclosure 
compliance as well as the control variables are presented in Panel A of Table 4.  Panel B 
of Table 4 reports correlations among the dependent and independent variables and thus 
provides univariate results.  Disclosure compliance for Italian firms is significantly 
positively related with size, growth, audit quality, profitability, institutional ownership 
and southern origin.  We take particular interest in the result for the geographic origin 
dummy.  The Italian business environment has been documented to be geographically 
diverse (Gerschenkron [1955], Eckaus [1961], Terrasi [1999]).  In general, the informal 
institutions that shape the governance environment of Italian society are very different 
between the northern, central, and southern regions of Italy.  Especially in the South, 
informal governance institutions are influential and can be expected to reduce the demand 
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for formal disclosure compliance.  For the German sample, disclosure compliance is 
significantly positively associated with size, independent board members, audit quality, 
and early IFRS adoption.     
The correlations between dependent variables are generally low to moderate with the 
exemption of FAMBUS and GOVOWN, which have a correlation of -0.490.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 4, Panel C presents the multivariate results of model (5).  Taken together, these 
results clearly indicate that both in Germany and Italy, firm-level incentives influence 
disclosure compliance.  Evidence from the pooled-sample analysis shows that the 
coefficients on size, profitability, growth, and government ownership are significantly 
more pronounced for Italy than for Germany.  This result indicates that larger, growing, 
and more profitable firms generally tend to provide more forthcoming disclosures in Italy 
than in Germany while the interplay between governmental ownership in firms and their 
disclosure compliance seems to be more pronounced in Italy than in Germany.  The 
impact of high quality auditing on disclosure compliance also appears to be more 
pronounced in Italy, possibly because Italian audit firms tend to be more heterogeneous 
in terms of quality than German firms (Ashbaugh and Warfield [2003]).  While for Italy 
we find a robust negative impact of the geographical region on disclosure compliance, we 
do not find a similar effect for Germany although, subsequent to reunification, a lack of 
convergence between the less developed East and the more industrialized West led to 
considerable disparity in the levels of income, investment, and productivity (Boltho et al. 
[1999]).  We view this finding as indicating that it is not the overall economic situation of 
a less developed region that drives differences in disclosure compliance; rather, the 
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relationship-driven institutions that Southern Italy has developed over centuries (and that 
are unavailable in Eastern Germany) act as an alternative communication device for 
corporations.  Not surprisingly, German firms show overall higher disclosure compliance 
than Italian firms.  Based on the insight from the geographical region results, this finding 
might be driven by different cultural attitudes towards compliance in general.  Our 
findings are also in line with the common-held belief that Italian firms tend to “label 
adopt” IFRS without any serious commitment to transparency because, in a strong insider 
system like Italy, information asymmetries are mainly resolved via means other than 
publicly disclosing accounting information.  This finding is consistent with the argument 
supported by Daske et al. [2011].  Finally, our results show that early adopters provide 
better disclosure compliance than late adopters.  This result might be driven by learning 
curve effects or by omitted explanatory variables that influence the IFRS adoption 
decision as well as the incentives for disclosure compliance. 
Taken together, the tests indicate that compliance might be an important moderating 
variable for the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption.  Based on the analysis 
presented in this section, we expect large firms with dominant auditors and independent 
boards to be more compliant.  The final series of tests will investigate whether the 
compliance determinants identified in this section moderate the comparability effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
3.5 THE COMPARABILITY EFFECT OF MANDATORY IFRS ADOPTION: THE 
MODERATING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES 
In order to directly test for the impact of compliance on the comparability effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption, one would have to obtain firm-level data on compliance for 
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the broad international sample used in the first series of tests.  As this seems prohibitively 
costly, we use the results of the first test to investigate a potential link of compliance 
determinants to the comparability effect. 
To do so, we focus on size and auditor type, as we have access to board data only for 
a very limited fraction of our sample.  In essence, we are breaking up the observations 
from the first series of tests in smaller bins that are constructed on period, country-pairs, 
industry, and our moderating variable of interest.  This, at the same time, increases 
(because of the finer bins) and decreases (newly constructed bins fall below the size 
threshold of three observations per bin) the number of observations. 
[Table 5 about here] 
We use size (measured by market capitalization) as our first moderating variable of 
interest.  We country-rank each firm into size quintiles (from 0 to 4).  Then, we add the 
ranks of both firms within a given match.  This leads to rank scores from 0 (both firms 
very small) to 8 (both firms very large).  We divide each sum by eight, so that our final 
moderating variable SIZE is distributed between 0 and 1.  We then fully interact our base 
models (5) and (6) by SIZE.9 
Panel A of Table 5 details the results of the tests for the pre IFRS period.  It seems 
important to note that overall larger firms seem to exhibit higher levels of comparability.  
Also, larger firms seem to show a small effect of the non-GAAP institutional 
environment on financial accounting comparability.  These findings are in line with prior 
results (Lang et al. [2010]) indicating that larger more visible firms are less affected by 
                                                 
9 For all the analyses presented in this section we conduct robustness checks (untabulated) where we 
also include additional control variables (mean size, mean book-to-market, standard deviation of 
earnings and cash flows) into our modified versions of models (5) and (6).  For model (6), we use 
changes instead of levels.  Our inferences remain unchanged. 
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national infrastructures and become more comparable with their international peers.  
Finally, we see that larger firms consistently show a larger impact of local GAAP on 
financial accounting comparability.  This finding is consistent with larger firms being 
more compliant to GAAP on average and thus with GAAP differences across countries 
having a larger impact on financial accounting comparability for larger firms. 
Panel B reports the results of the difference-in-difference-in-differences test for the 
effect of IFRS adoption.  We focus our discussion on the impact of IFRS_EFFECT.  As 
can be assessed from the interaction of IFRS_EFFECT with SIZE, the effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on comparability seems to get completely moderated by size: 
The larger the respective firm, the more pronounced the IFRS effect.  The relevant 
coefficient has the predicted sign for each of the four dependent variables 
((DKVCOMP), (R_DKVCOMP), (CFCOMP), and (R_CFCOMP)) and 
significantly so in two out of the four cases ((CFCOMP) and (R_CFCOMP)).  Based 
on this analysis we conclude that the comparability effect of IFRS adoption seems to be 
more pronounced for relatively larger firms, which have higher incentives for 
compliance.  The results for the Wald-test that tests for the combined significance of the 
main effect IFRS_EFFECT together with the interaction effect IFRS_EFFECT*SIZE 
indicate that, generally, the firm-matches in the group of the largest firms experience a 
significantly positive IFRS adoption effect on comparability. 
We repeat the analysis with our second compliance incentive: being audited by a 
large, dominant audit firm.  Following established auditing literature (DeAngelo [1981]), 
we view Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PWC as dominant audit firms and assume 
that dominant auditors provide higher auditing quality.  To the extent that dominant 
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auditors have an incentive to provide higher audit quality we expect firms with higher 
incentives for compliance to contract with dominant audit firms in equilibrium.  To 
measure the impact of dominant auditors at the firm-peer level we construct an AUDIT 
score that takes the value of 0/0.5/1 if no/one/both firms in the match are being audited by 
a dominant auditor at the end of the sample period.  We use this AUDIT variable to fully 
interact the models (5) and (6). 
[Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 presents the results.  Similar to the results for SIZE, we find that financial 
accounting comparability is generally larger for firms with dominant auditors.  Also, we 
find weak evidence that for firm pairs with dominant auditors the effect of GAAP 
proximity on financial accounting comparability is stronger.  For all dependent variables 
the relevant coefficient for the interaction of AUDIT and GAAP_PROX is positive, but 
significantly so only in one case (R_CFCOMP).  Generally, this confirms our expectations 
that firms with dominant auditors act more alike in terms of financial reporting and are 
more compliant to their respective GAAP environments, strengthening the impact of 
GAAP proximity on comparability. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the difference-in-difference-in-differences analysis.  We 
find clear evidence consistent with dominant auditors moderating the effect of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on comparability.  Firms with dominant auditors seem to have a relatively 
larger effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on comparability. 
Finally, we combine SIZE and AUDIT to a joint measure for compliance incentives 
by adding the ranks (0 to 8) and (0 to 2) and by standardizing it on a 0 to 1 interval.  We 
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label this variable as COMPINC and use it as a moderating variable to the models (5) and 
(6).  Results of the analysis are presented in Table 7. 
[Table 7 about here] 
The findings of the analysis confirm the results of the first two tests.  First, firms with 
larger compliance incentives consistently show higher levels of financial accounting 
comparability.  Second, compliance incentives limit the impact of local institutional 
environments on comparability.  Third, compliance incentives strengthen the impact of 
GAAP proximity on the financial accounting comparability of firms.  Finally, compliance 
incentives moderate the treatment effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on comparability: 
Firms with larger compliance incentives experience larger comparability effects. 
3.6 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
In order to verify the robustness of our findings and to shed some light on the 
implications of comparability, we conduct a set of additional analyses (results are not 
tabulated but available upon request).  First, we verify that our results are not due to 
sample composition by repeating our main analyses for two different samples.  The first 
sample contains all firms of the sample explained in Table 1 but excludes observations 
from the U.S., Japan, and the U.K..  The second sample contains a maximum of 100 firms 
for each country.  If a country has more than 100 firms in the sample of Table 1, 100 
firms are randomly chosen. 
We find qualitatively very similar results for both alternative samples.  For the 
second sample the results are somewhat weaker, most likely because the reduced sample 
size compared to the sample detailed in Table 1 (20,840 instead of 78,784 firm-year 
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observations).  As we are drawing the same main inferences (marginal overall 
comparability effect and moderating effect of compliance incentives on the comparability 
effect) from our two alternative samples, we conclude that our main findings are not an 
artifact of our sample composition. 
In a next step we try to use alternative ways to identify a comparability effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption.  While we already use three different metrics in our main 
analyses (the return-based DeFranco et al. [2011] measure, our cash flow-based measure, 
and accounting compliance as assessed by hand-collected data) it might still be that we 
fail to document a robust overall comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption 
because of the noise inherent in our comparability measures.  We therefore assess the 
change of the cross-sectional variance of financial statement line items and earnings 
attributes (unexpected accruals, conservatism, persistence, predictability, smoothness, 
timeliness, and value relevance) pre and post mandatory IFRS adoption for our firm-years 
detailed in Table 1.  We measure the variance effect within size-industry bins of firms 
from different countries.  Since an observed decrease in variance could be caused by 
increased accounting comparability as well as by decreased discriminatory power of 
accounting information, we view this approach as a second-best method to identify 
comparability effects. 
Overall, we find no consistent decrease in variance of earnings attributes that could 
be linked to IFRS adoption.  Also, we find no substantial effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on the cross-sectional variance of financial statement line items, with one note-
worthy exemption: The mandatory adoption of IFRS seems to have a significant impact 
on the cross-sectional variance of other provisions and, to a lesser extent, to the cross-
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sectional variance of intangible assets (excluding goodwill).  On the other hand, the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS seems to have an increasing impact on the cross-sectional 
variance of reported goodwill figures.  We conclude from this analysis that the overall 
impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the cross-country variance of reported key 
accounting information is modest.  
In a last series of tests, we reassess the relevance of accounting comparability for 
capital markets.  Although this is not the main focus of our study, it is interesting to see 
whether our comparability measures are consistently linked to measures like forecast 
precision, forecast dispersion and bid-ask spreads.  This issue is being investigated by De 
Franco et al. [2011] for the U.S. and by Lang et al. [2010] for international data.  We 
repeat their analysis with our metrics to verify that our comparability measures are also 
related to the above constructs.  We find our measures to be consistently positively linked 
to forecast precision, negatively linked to forecast dispersion and, but to a lesser extent, 
negatively related to bid-ask spreads.  We view these findings as an additional 
verification test for our comparability metrics.  Also, they are consistent with accounting 
comparability having (desirable) capital market consequences. 
4. Conclusion 
In this study we examine whether mandatory adoption of IFRS leads to an increase in 
cross-country comparability of accounting information.  Using a broad cross-country 
sample of 2,155 mandatory IFRS adopting firms, our analyses using two comparability 
metrics based on De Franco et al. [2011] indicate no clear overall impact of mandatory 
IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting information across countries.  
In a second set of tests we explore possible explanations for our limited findings on the 
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comparability effects of mandatory IFRS adoption.  We use a sample of hand-collected 
IFRS compliance data from German and Italian firms to document that even under 
harmonized accounting standards, firm-, region-, and country-level incentives lead to 
heterogeneous compliance and thus heterogeneous financial accounting information.  As 
a third step, we use the identified compliance incentives (captured by size and auditor 
type) to refine our analysis based on the broad cross-country sample.  We find that high 
compliance incentives: (a) increase the overall comparability of financial accounting 
information, (b) limit the impact of the national infrastructures on comparability, and (c) 
moderate the treatment effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on financial accounting 
compliance: Firms with higher compliance incentives experience systematically larger 
IFRS comparability effects.  
We conclude from our analysis that the effect of IFRS on comparability can be 
expected to be marginal on average and centered on firms that have high incentives for 
compliance.  From an economic perspective, this is consistent with the interplay between 
incentives and standards, which has been documented by prior literature, and casts some 
doubt as to whether de jure harmonization can be expected to generate (supposedly 
socially desirable) comparability effects.  On the other hand, results on potential positive 
capital market consequences of an IFRS comparability effect (Wang [2010], Brochet et 
al. [2011], DeFond et al. [2011]) tend to be based on firms that are in the center of the 
attention of (international) investors.  For these firms, compliance incentives can assumed 
to be fairly high.  
Our results are subject to some important caveats.  First, they are based on a quasi-
experiment: our “treatments” countries and IFRS adoption are not randomly assigned to 
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our research subjects.  While we try to address this concern by using a difference-in-
difference-in-differences approach and by constructing matched samples where feasible, 
these procedures nonetheless are likely to generate sub-optimal results.  Second, our 
measurement constructs are noisy and thus capture our economic dependent variable of 
interest (financial accounting information and its cross-sectional comparability) with 
error.  To improve the reliability of our findings, we try to increase the power of our 
statistical tests by conducting a battery of analyses designed to capture different aspects 
of our dependent variable. 
Third, with respect to external validity, we try to make our results as general as 
possible by drawing from a large sample of countries for our first and third test.  
However, this large sample evidence might give rise to internal validity concerns.  While 
we try to address these concerns by conducting an additional test that uses high quality 
hand-collected data, additional research using institutional expertise to investigate the 
effect of IFRS adoption on comparability in other jurisdictions using similar data seems 
warranted. 
Finally, it is important to note that comparability of financial accounting information 
as defined in this paper is neither good nor bad per se, and thus this paper does not take a 
stand on whether IRFS adoption improves the quality of financial accounting.  Such a 
question is likely to be difficult to tackle absent an unambiguous measure of “financial 
accounting quality.” 
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APPENDIX 1: ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION  
AND TEST DESIGN 
 
The concept of comparability is based on a comparison of firm-pairs.  In order to assess 
the treatment effect of IFRS adoption on comparability we need to compare sets of firms 
whose level of comparability is likely to be affected by IFRS adoption.  We attempt to 
achieve this goal by comparing firms within the same SIC two-digit industry across 
countries.  Using the DKVCOMP and CFCOMP measures constructed as described in the 
research design section, we observe the average comparability of firms from one country 
(e.g., the U.S.) with firms from another country (e.g., the U.K.), separately for each two-
digit industry group with sufficient data and for the pre and post IFRS regime change 
period.  This procedure yields us a dataset with the following structure: 
COUNTRY PCOUNTRY IND PERIOD GAAP_PROX DKVCOMP CFCOMP 
U.K. U.S. 20 PRE -0.167 -0.042 -0.071 
U.K. U.S. 20 POST -0.222 -0.046 -0.070 
U.K. Germany 20 PRE -0.556 -0.056 -0.111 
U.K. Germany 20 POST 0.000 -0.058 -0.094 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
 
COUNTRY and PCOUNTRY indicate the two countries that are being compared, IND 
stands for the two-digit SIC code of the respective firms.  PERIOD indicates the period 
pre (2001-2004) and post (2005-2008) IFRS adoption.  GAAP_PROX captures the 
country-pair GAAP distance by summing up differences between two countries based on 
the GAAP differences measure presented in Bae et al. [2008: Table 1].  The variable is 
multiplied by minus one and recoded to be distributed between -1 and 0 so that larger 
(less negative) values indicate more similar accounting regimes.  DKVCOMP and 
CFCOMP are our comparability measures.  For both measures, larger (less negative) 
values indicate more comparable financial accounting information.  
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These example data show that the comparability of U.K. firms with U.S. firms can be 
expected to be affected by the adoption of IFRS in the U.K.: After IFRS adoption the 
accounting regime in the U.K. becomes more dissimilar to the accounting regime of the 
U.S. while becoming identical with the accounting regime of Germany.  In order to 
capture this relation, our main treatment variable is the change of GAAP_PROX between 
the 2004 and 2008 periods (IFRS_EFFECT).  While this variable is zero for country pairs 
where neither country has adopted IFRS (our control group), it is different from zero 
whenever at least one country has adopted IFRS (our treatment group). 
As stated in the research design section, our tests are based on the following change 
analysis: 
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Since the according samples are organized by country-country-industry, we can use 
country-fixed effects for both country dimensions as well as industry-fixed effects in our 
regressions.  The country-level fixed effects allow us to effectively control for country-
level institutions that might affect the overall rigidness of a country’s accounting regime 
(like enforcement, efficiency of the auditing process, etc.).  Using IFRS_EFFECT as our 
treatment enhances the power of our tests compared to a traditional difference-in-
differences setting where the treatment is modeled by a binary state variable.  
Conceptually, our analysis constitutes a “difference-in-difference-in-differences” (DDD) 
approach as we are testing for systematic cross-sectional differences in the magnitude of 
the IFRS treatment effect (Bertrand et al. [2004]). 
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APPENDIX 2: INSTRUMENT FOR IFRS COMPLIANCE TEST 
 
IFRS 2 
Applicability Does the entity utilize share based payments? 
Measurement 
compliance 
Does the entity measure equity instruments at the fair value of goods or services 
received? 
Disclosure 
compliance 
Is there a general description of the nature and extent of share-based payment 
arrangements that existed during the period? 
Is there a description of how the fair value of the goods or services received, or 
the fair value of the equity instruments granted, during the period was 
determined? 
Does the entity provide detailed information about the effect of share-based 
payment transactions on the entity's profit or loss for the period and on its 
financial position? 
IAS 11 
Applicability Does the entity have construction contracts? 
Measurement 
Compliance 
Does the entity provide initial recognition / subsequent measurement according to 
the percentage of completion method? 
Disclosure 
compliance 
Does the entity provide information about the amount of contract revenue 
recognized? 
Does the entity provide information about the method used to determine revenue? 
Does the entity provide information about the method used to determine stage of 
completion? 
IAS 17 
Applicability Does the entity utilize lease contracts? 
Measurement 
compliance 
Are finance leases recorded as an asset and a liability at the lower of the fair 
value of the asset and the present value of the minimum lease payments? 
Disclosure 
compliance 
Is the carrying amount of asset disclosed? 
Does the entity provide a reconciliation between total minimum lease payments 
and their present value? 
Does the entity provide information about the contingent rent recognized as an 
expense? 
IAS 19 
Applicability Is the standard applicable? 
Measurement 
compliance 
Are post employment benefits recognized as the net present value of the future 
final obligation (actuarial calculation)? 
Disclosure 
compliance 
Does the entity provide a general description of the post employment benefits 
plan? 
Does the entity provide a description of the methods utilized to calculate any 
actuarial gain or losses? 
Does the entity provide a reconciliation between the actual and the booked 
pension liability? 
Does the entity provide a reconciliation between the beginning of the period and 
the end of the period value of the obligation? 
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(APPENDIX 2 CONTINUED) 
 
IAS 33 
Applicability Is the standard applicable? 
Disclosure 
compliance 
Does the entity disclose basic EPS? 
Does the entity disclose diluted EPS? 
Does the entity disclose the amounts used as the numerators in calculating basic 
and diluted EPS, and a reconciliation of those amounts to profit or loss 
attributable to the parent entity for the period? 
Does the entity disclose the weighted average number of ordinary shares used as 
the denominator in calculating basic and diluted EPS, and a reconciliation of 
these denominators to each other? 
IAS 36 
Applicability Is the standard applicable? 
Measurement 
compliance 
Does the entity calculate the recoverable amount as value in use or fair value less 
cost to sell? 
Does the entity perform a yearly impairment test for goodwill (if any)? 
Disclosure 
compliance 
If recoverable amount is value in use, is the basis for determining value in use 
disclosed (cash flow projections, discount rate, etc.)? 
If recoverable amount is fair value less costs to sell, is the basis for determining 
fair value disclosed? 
If the recoverable amount is not determined for each individual asset, does the 
entity provide information about cash generating units?  
IAS 38 
Applicability Does the entity present intangible assets in the balance sheet? 
Measurement 
compliance 
Does the entity capitalize any of research costs, start-up costs, advertising costs? 
Does the entity expense internally generated intangible assets? 
Disclosure 
compliance 
Is the useful life or amortization rate disclosed? 
Is the amortization method disclosed? 
Does the entity provide a reconciliation of the carrying amount at the beginning 
and the end of the period? 
IAS 39 
Applicability Is the standard applicable? 
Measurement 
compliance 
Is fair value the initial recognition measurement basis for financial assets? 
Is amortized cost the measurement basis for held to maturity investments? 
Is fair value to equity the measurement basis for available for sale financial 
assets? 
Is fair value to profit and loss the measurement basis for held for trading financial 
assets? 
Does the entity recognize derivatives on the balance sheet? 
Disclosure 
compliance 
Are methods and assumptions used in estimating fair values disclosed? 
Does the entity provide a description of the enterprise's financial risk 
management objectives and policies? 
Does the entity provide for each category of hedge (if any): A description of the 
hedge; which financial instruments are designated as hedging instruments; and 
the nature of the risks being hedged? 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This Table reports the base sample and descriptive statistics for our dependent and independent variables.  The balanced sample of firm-year observations 
that is used to construct the comparability metrics is presented in Panel A.  Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest.  In Panel 
C Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal.  Significant correlations at the 1% (two-sided) appear in bold print.  DKVCOMP is a 
comparability measure based on De Franco et al. [2011], where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings on return 
regressions.  CFCOMP is a similar construct, where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings on cash flow regressions.  
R_(c) indicates the ranked version of our measurement c.  The calculation of both metrics is explained in detail in the paper.  Variables are averaged at the 
country, peer country, and industry level.  SMCTRY is a binary variable taking the value of one if country and peer country are the same. GAAP_PROX 
measures the proximity between GAAP regimes, based on the data used by Bae et al. [2008]. 
Panel A: Sample Composition 
IFRS Adopting Countries   Non-Adopting Countries 
  Pre 2005  Post 2005     Pre 2005  Post 2005  
Country Frequency Percent   Frequency Percent Total  Country Frequency Percent   Frequency Percent Total 
Australia 1,380 0.16  1,380 0.16 2,760  Brazil 492 0.02  492 0.02 984 
Denmark 244 0.03  244 0.03 488  Canada 1,408 0.05  1,408 0.05 2,816 
Finland 324 0.04  324 0.04 648  Chile 424 0.01  424 0.01 848 
France 1,344 0.16  1,344 0.16 2,688  China 548 0.02  548 0.02 1,096 
Germany 456 0.05  456 0.05 912  India 824 0.03  824 0.03 1648 
Greece 588 0.07  588 0.07 1,176  Indonesia 628 0.02  628 0.02 1,256 
Italy 444 0.05  444 0.05 888  Japan 9,680 0.31  9,680 0.31 19,360 
Netherlands 280 0.03  280 0.03 560  Malaysia 1,640 0.05  1,640 0.05 3280 
Norway 240 0.03  240 0.03 480  Mexico 240 0.01  240 0.01 480 
Philippines 340 0.04  340 0.04 680  Pakistan 232 0.01  232 0.01 464 
South Africa 524 0.06  524 0.06 1,048  South Korea 2,108 0.07  2,108 0.07 4,216 
Spain 260 0.03  260 0.03 520  Taiwan 1,416 0.05  1,416 0.05 2832 
Sweden 616 0.07  616 0.07 1,232  Thailand 836 0.03  836 0.03 1,672 
United Kingdom 1,580 0.18  1,580 0.18 3,160  Turkey 260 0.01  260 0.01 520 
         United States 10,036 0.33  10,036 0.33 20,072 
Total 8,620 1.00  8,620 1.00 17,240  Total 30,772 1.00  30,772 1.00 61,544 
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TABLE 1 - Continued 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable N Mean SD Min 25% Median 75% Max 
DKVCOMP 16,816 -0.187 0.125 -0.681 -0.243 -0.158 -0.097 -0.026 
R_DKVCOMP 16,816 -0.517 0.145 -0.926 -0.598 -0.504 -0.424 -0.187 
CFCOMP 16,816 -0.074 0.043 -0.271 -0.091 -0.065 -0.045 -0.016 
R_CFCOMP 16,816 -0.517 0.122 -0.885 -0.584 -0.510 -0.443 -0.224 
SMCTRY 16,816 0.033 0.178 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
GAAP_PROX 16,816 -0.470 0.192 0.000 -0.333 -0.444 -0.611 -1.000 
Panel C: Correlations 
  A B C D E F 
A: DKVCOMP  0.588 0.305 0.166 0.023 0.015 
B: R_DKVCOMP 0.604  0.173 0.286 0.051 0.048 
C: CFCOMP 0.357 0.202  0.468 0.028 -0.041 
D: R_CFCOMP 0.184 0.275 0.554  0.060 0.005 
E: SMCNTRY 0.024 0.051 0.036 0.054  0.452 
F: GAAP_PROX 0.009 0.040 -0.049 -0.001 0.310   
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TABLE 2 
 
Comparability Tests 
This Table reports the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting 
information.  DKVCOMP is a comparability measure based on De Franco et al. [2011], where firm-to-firm 
comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings on return regressions.  CFCOMP is a similar 
construct, where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings on cash flow 
regressions.  R_(c) indicates the ranked version of our measurement c.  The calculation of both metrics is 
explained in detail in the paper.  Variables are averaged at the country, peer country, and industry level.  
SMCTRY is a binary variable taking the value of one if country and peer country are the same. GAAP_PROX 
measures the proximity between GAAP regimes, based on the data used by Bae et al. [2008].  In Panel B, the 
dependent variable is the change in comparability measures relative to the pre IFRS period.  IFRS_EFFECT is 
the change in GAAP_PROX caused by IFRS adoption. Robust standard errors clustered by country, peer 
country and industry are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.  ***/**/* marks two-sided significance 
at the 1/5/10% level.  
Panel A: Comparability Analysis Pre IFRS (N=16,816) 
  Model (5)   Model (5)  Model (5)   Model (5) 
Dependent Variable DKVCOMP   R_DKVCOMP   CFCOMP   R_CFCOMP 
Intercept -0.102***  -0.684***  -0.123***  -0.665*** 
 (0.020)  (0.006)  (0.040)  (0.083) 
SMCTRY 0.014***  0.042***  0.002  0.021*** 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
GAAP_PROX 0.003  0.013*  0.007***  0.030*** 
 (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.002)   (0.007) 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.259  0.169  0.289  0.070 
Panel B: Comparability Analysis IFRS Effect (N=16,411) 
  Model (6)   Model (6)  Model (6)   Model (6) 
Parameter DKVCOMP)   R_DKVCOMP)   CFCOMP)   R_CFCOMP) 
Intercept 0.025  0.115  0.029  0.076 
 (0.028)  (0.149)  (0.025)  (0.144) 
SMCTRY -0.011**  -0.023***  0.000  0.000 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
IFRS_EFFECT -0.002  0.001  0.002  0.012* 
 (0.005)   (0.007)   (0.002)   (0.007) 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.201  0.086  0.090  0.026 
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TABLE 3 
IFRS Compliance Tests 
This Table reports average IFRS measurement and disclosure compliance scores (a value of one 
indicating full compliance) for the late adopters and matched German samples and for the Italian 
sample.  Firms included in these samples are at least listed since 2004 and have their 2006 group 
financial reports available either on the respective investor relation section of the respective 
website or on the respective stock exchange website.  The instrument utilized to evaluate the IFRS 
measurement and disclosure compliance is available in Appendix 2.  SD stands for standard 
deviation.  A t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank test) is used to test for differences in means (medians).  
***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
Panel A: Accounting Measurement Compliance 
Germany Late versus Italy 
  Germany Late   Italy       
Standard   n Mean Median SD     n Mean Median SD   t-value Z-score 
IFRS 2 15 1.000 1.000 0.000  67 0.925 1.000 0.265   1.09 1.07 
IAS 11 20 1.000 1.000 0.000  48 1.000 1.000 0.000  n/a n/a 
IAS 17 75 0.987 1.000 0.115  125 0.992 1.000 0.089  -0.37 -0.36 
IAS 19 111 0.991 1.000 0.095  153 0.967 1.000 0.178  1.27 1.27 
IAS 36 120 0.950 1.000 0.176  153 0.964 1.000 0.153  -0.70 -0.78 
IAS 38 135 0.930 1.000 0.185  152 0.974 1.000 0.138  -2.30** -2.81*** 
IAS 39 107 0.898 1.000 0.217   132 0.978 1.000 0.100   -3.77*** -3.90*** 
 
Germany Matched versus Italy 
  Germany Matched   Italy       
Standard   n Mean Median SD     n Mean Median SD   t-value Z-score 
IFRS 2 51 1.000 1.000 0.000  67 0.925 1.000 0.265   2.01** 1.98** 
IAS 11 29 1.000 1.000 0.000  48 1.000 1.000 0.000  n/a n/a 
IAS 17 90 1.000 1.000 0.000  125 0.992 1.000 0.089  0.85 0.84 
IAS 19 110 0.991 1.000 0.095  153 0.967 1.000 0.178  1.26 1.26 
IAS 36 140 0.979 1.000 0.118  153 0.964 1.000 0.153   0.90 0.92 
IAS 38 151 0.950 1.000 0.161  152 0.974 1.000 0.138  -1.36 -1.83* 
IAS 39 121 0.936 1.000 0.149   132 0.978 1.000 0.100   -2.61*** -2.70*** 
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Panel B: Disclosure Compliance 
Germany Late versus Italy 
  Germany Late   Italy       
Standard   n Mean Median SD     N Mean Median SD   t-value Z-score 
IFRS 2 17 0.559 0.333 0.328  66 0.828 1.000 0.327   -3.03*** -3.23*** 
IAS 11 21 0.810 1.000 0.249  49 0.673 0.667 0.357  1.59 1.38 
IAS 17 120 0.772 1.000 0.343  125 0.613 0.667 0.370  3.48*** 3.67*** 
IAS 19 121 0.607 0.750 0.318  153 0.657 0.750 0.320  -1.27 -1.49 
IAS 33 136 0.827 1.000 0.231  153 0.840 1.000 0.273  -0.42 -1.77* 
IAS 36 105 0.324 0.333 0.334  152 0.471 0.333 0.403  -3.09*** -2.88*** 
IAS 38 135 0.877 1.000 0.240  153 0.741 1.000 0.332  3.93*** 3.58*** 
IAS 39 107 0.460 0.500 0.305   131 0.691 1.000 0.384   -5.06*** -5.35*** 
 
Germany Matched versus Italy 
  Germany Matched   Italy       
Standard   n Mean Median SD     N Mean Median SD   t-value Z-score 
IFRS 2 57 0.681 0.667 0.360  66 0.828 1.000 0.327   -2.37** -2.66*** 
IAS 11 29 0.874 1.000 0.226  49 0.673 0.667 0.357  2.71*** 2.62*** 
IAS 17 137 0.815 1.000 0.308  125 0.613 0.667 0.370  4.81*** 4.83*** 
IAS 19 117 0.686 0.750 0.296  153 0.657 0.750 0.320  0.76 0.51 
IAS 33 153 0.887 1.000 0.209  153 0.840 1.000 0.273  1.71* 0.76 
IAS 36 125 0.517 0.667 0.418  152 0.471 0.333 0.403  0.93 0.81 
IAS 38 151 0.929 1.000 0.183  153 0.741 1.000 0.332  6.13*** 5.60*** 
IAS 39 122 0.633 0.500 0.351   131 0.691 1.000 0.384   -1.26 -1.73* 
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TABLE 4 
Determinants of Disclosure Compliance 
The 2006 German and Italian samples contain observations that fulfill the data requirements for 
estimating the models of Panel C.  In Panel C, ITALY is a dummy variable coded one if the 
respective observation stems from an Italian firm and zero otherwise.  DSCORE is average disclosure 
compliance, calculated using the instrument presented in Appendix 2. %INDEP_BOARD_D is a 
dummy variable for board independence that, for the Italian sample is coded one if the number of 
independent directors divided by the total number of board members is above the full sample mean 
and zero otherwise, and, for the German sample is coded one if the head of the supervisory board has 
not been the former chief executive officer of the respective firm and zero otherwise.  INSTOWN is a 
dummy variable indicating significant institutional ownership (above 2%) in the firm.  GOVOWN is 
a dummy variable indicating whether a governmental body has a stake in the respective firm.  
FAMBUS is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective firm is controlled by a managing 
family.  BIG4 is a dummy variable indicating whether the financial statements of the respective firm 
have been audited by a dominant audit supplier (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG or PWC). 
LD_REGION is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective German (Italian) firm is 
domiciled in the eastern regions of Germany (southern regions of Italy).  EARLY is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm is an early or a late adopter of IFRS.  Robust standard errors 
clustered by industry are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.  In Panel A, SD stands for 
Standard Deviation.  In Panel B Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal.  
Bold typeset indicates two-sided significance below the 5 % level.  The models of Panel C are 
estimated using ordinary least squares and industry fixed effects.  Probabilities are two-sided. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
German 2006 Sample (n=252) 
Variable Mean SD 25 % Median 75 % 
DSCORE 0.738 0.178 0.640 0.756 0.865 
LOG(TOTASS) 12.060 2.037 10.704 11.816 13.037 
ROA 0.020 0.137 -0.004 0.035 0.073 
MTB 1.968 4.513 1.089 1.695 2.814 
FREQ_LOSSES 0.342 0.334 0.000 0.200 0.600 
INDEP_BOARD_D 0.591     
INSTOWN 0.361     
GOVOWN 0.048     
FAMBUS 0.194     
BIG4 0.563     
LD_REGION 0.067     
EARLY 0.460     
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Italian 2006 Sample (n=153) 
Variable Mean SD 25 % Median 75 % 
DSCORE 0.678 0.227 0.522 0.700 0.870 
LOG(TOTASS) 13.089 1.801 11.807 12.817 14.225 
ROA 0.016 0.067 -0.012 0.020 0.049 
MTB 2.324 2.822 1.314 1.837 2.615 
FREQ_LOSSES 0.344 0.371 0.000 0.200 0.600 
INDEP_BOARD_D 0.392     
INSTOWN 0.386     
GOVOWN 0.137     
FAMBUS 0.601     
BIG4 0.863     
LD_REGION 0.033     
 
 
 53 
TABLE 4 - Continued 
Panel B: Correlations 
German 2006 Sample 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L 
A: DSCORE  0.328 -0.068 -0.022 0.035 0.259 -0.044 0.060 -0.094 0.293 0.005 0.424 
B: LOG(TOTASS) 0.300  0.163 0.082 -0.436 0.185 0.011 0.284 0.050 0.321 -0.085 0.084 
C: ROA -0.055 0.140  0.166 -0.452 -0.035 0.035 0.044 0.037 -0.045 -0.076 -0.177 
D: MTB 0.100 0.154 0.181  -0.115 -0.042 0.050 0.019 -0.006 0.004 0.109 0.001 
E: FREQ_LOSSES 0.023 -0.459 -0.471 -0.073  -0.016 -0.031 -0.148 -0.161 -0.065 0.121 0.199 
F: INDEP_BOARD_D 0.266 0.175 0.032 0.116 -0.026  -0.030 0.072 -0.081 0.001 0.031 0.169 
G: INSTOWN -0.054 0.083 0.039 -0.043 -0.040 -0.030  -0.129 -0.369 0.129 -0.038 -0.147 
H: GOVOWN 0.049 0.233 0.040 0.086 -0.138 0.072 -0.129  -0.063 0.122 -0.060 0.018 
I: FAMBUS -0.080 0.059 0.033 -0.047 -0.172 -0.081 -0.369 -0.063  -0.073 0.148 -0.051 
J: BIG4 0.300 0.308 -0.041 0.119 -0.053 0.001 0.129 0.122 -0.073  0.045 0.219 
K: LD_REGION 0.023 -0.098 -0.033 0.006 0.143 0.031 -0.038 -0.060 0.148 0.045  0.037 
L: EARLY 0.432 0.026 -0.106 0.147 0.185 0.169 -0.147 0.018 -0.051 0.219 0.037  
Italian 2006 Sample 
 A B C D E F G H I J K 
A: DSCORE  0.462 0.283 0.112 -0.227 0.147 0.244 -0.042 0.071 0.302 -0.315 
B: LOG(TOTASS) 0.439  0.222 -0.114 -0.412 0.072 0.204 0.324 -0.127 0.325 -0.122 
C: ROA 0.284 0.311  0.040 -0.610 -0.157 0.206 0.065 0.153 0.127 -0.103 
D: MTB 0.190 0.036 0.206  0.046 0.145 0.169 -0.012 -0.104 0.019 -0.015 
E: FREQ_LOSSES -0.199 -0.406 -0.714 -0.115  0.035 -0.119 -0.268 -0.138 -0.266 0.147 
F: INDEP_BOARD_D 0.141 0.044 -0.089 0.139 0.036  0.106 0.146 -0.057 -0.108 0.003 
G: INSTOWN 0.239 0.228 0.208 0.260 -0.122 0.106  -0.004 -0.041 0.160 -0.070 
H: GOVOWN -0.040 0.264 0.118 0.008 -0.269 0.146 -0.004  -0.490 0.159 0.034 
I: FAMBUS 0.085 -0.079 0.135 -0.094 -0.148 -0.057 -0.041 -0.490  -0.092 -0.076 
J: BIG4 0.281 0.343 0.161 0.034 -0.236 -0.108 0.160 0.159 -0.092  -0.034 
K: LD_REGION -0.270 -0.100 -0.098 -0.030 0.133 0.003 -0.070 0.034 -0.076 -0.034  
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Panel C: Multivariate Analyses  
    DSCORE 
  Model (7) 
Parameter   Predicted Sign German Sample   Italian Sample   Pooled Sample 
ITALY      -0.531*** 
       (0.176) 
LOG(TOTASS) +  0.027***  0.056***  0.028*** 
    (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
ITALY*LOG(TOTASS)      0.026** 
       (0.010) 
ROA +/-  0.005  0.801***  0.009 
    (0.081)  (0.215)  (0.080) 
ITALY*ROA      0.795*** 
       (0.165) 
MTB +  -0.001  0.008**  -0.001 
    (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
ITALY*MTB      0.010* 
       (0.005) 
FREQ_LOSSES +  0.053  0.090*  0.053 
    (0.044)  (0.042)  (0.044) 
ITALY*FREQ_LOSSES      0.036 
       (0.078) 
INDEP_BOARD_D +  0.052**  0.083*  0.055*** 
    (0.010)  (0.040)  (0.009) 
ITALY*INDEP_BOARD_D      0.031 
       (0.044) 
INSTOWN +/-  -0.014  0.015  -0.019 
    (0.019)  (0.047)  (0.019) 
ITALY*INSTOWN      0.043 
       (0.054) 
GOVOWN +/-  -0.041**  -0.055**  -0.019 
    (0.012)  (0.022)  (0.016) 
ITALY*GOVOWN      -0.076* 
       (0.037) 
FAMBUS -  -0.034  0.007  -0.039 
    (0.045)  (0.012)  (0.047) 
ITALY*FAMBUS      0.054 
       (0.057) 
BIG4 +  0.047**  0.140**  0.048*** 
    (0.013)  (0.042)  (0.013) 
ITALY*BIG4      0.088* 
       (0.041) 
LD_REGION -  0.018  -0.278***  0.021 
    (0.045)  (0.069)  (0.046) 
ITALY*LD_REGION      -0.306*** 
       (0.056) 
EARLY +  0.104***    0.111*** 
     (0.020)       (0.022)  
Industry fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes 
n (R²)   252 (0.350)  153 (0.466)  405 (0.410) 
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TABLE 5 
Comparability Analysis: Moderated by Size 
This Table reports the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting 
information, moderated by the size of compared firms.  DKVCOMP is a comparability measure based on De 
Franco et al. [2011], where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings on 
return regressions.  CFCOMP is a similar construct, where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the 
similarity of firm-level earnings on cash flow regressions.  R_(c) indicates the ranked version of our 
measurement c.  The calculation of both metrics is explained in detail in the paper.  Variables are averaged at the 
country, peer country, and industry level.  SMCTRY is a binary variable taking the value of one if country and 
peer country are the same. GAAP_PROX measures the proximity between GAAP regimes, based on the data 
used by Bae et al. [2008].  SIZE is defined as the sum of country-level size quintiles for matched firms, where 
size is measured by lagged market capitalization.  SIZE is scaled to be distributed between 0 and 1.  The 
estimated models are interacted versions of models (5) and (6).  In Panel B, the dependent variable is the change 
in comparability measures relative to the pre IFRS period.  IFRS_EFFECT is the change in GAAP_PROX caused 
by IFRS adoption. Robust standard errors clustered by country, peer country and industry are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients.  p-value total IFRS_EFFECT reports the two-sided p-value of a Wald F-test 
that tests whether the sum of the coefficients for IFRS_EFFECT and IFRS_EFFECT*SIZE is significantly 
different from zero, effectively testing whether there is a significant comparability effect of IFRS adoption for the 
firm-pairs in the largest size bin.  ***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
Panel A: Comparability Analysis Pre IFRS (N=61,087) 
  Model (5*)   Model (5*)  Model (5*)   Model (5*) 
Dependent Variable DKVCOMP   R_DKVCOMP   CFCOMP   R_CFCOMP 
Intercept -0.200***  -0.616***  -0.065***  -0.757*** 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.006) 
SMCTRY 0.041***  0.049***  0.010***  0.051*** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.003)  (0.008) 
GAAP_PROX -0.037***  -0.006  -0.006  -0.014 
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.010) 
SIZE 0.238***  0.184***  0.043***  0.099*** 
 (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
SMCTRY * SIZE -0.055***  -0.006  -0.012***  -0.049*** 
 (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.004)  (0.012) 
GAAP_PROX *SIZE 0.078***  0.020  0.022***  0.089*** 
 (0.013)   (0.017)   (0.005)   (0.015) 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.347  0.208  0.278  0.063 
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Panel B: Comparability Analysis IFRS Effect (N=57,948) 
  Model (6*)   Model (6*)  Model (6*)   Model (6*) 
Dependent Variable DKVCOMP)   R_DKVCOMP)   CFCOMP)   R_CFCOMP) 
Intercept 0.102***  0.031***  -0.019***  0.014** 
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
SMCTRY -0.018**  -0.025***  0.001  0.001 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.008) 
IFRS_EFFECT -0.005  -0.008  -0.008**  -0.012 
 (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.009) 
SIZE -0.092***  -0.035***  0.003***  -0.006 
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
SMCTRY * SIZE 0.017  0.008  0.002  0.006 
 (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.012) 
IFRS_EFFECT*SIZE 0.015  0.009  0.016***  0.037*** 
 (0.010)   (0.015)   (0.004)   (0.013) 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
p-value total IFRS_EFFECT 0.081  0.857  0.000  0.003 
R2 0.187  0.070  0.062  0.014 
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Comparability Analysis: Moderated by Audit Type 
This Table reports the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting 
information, moderated by the auditor type of compared firms.  DKVCOMP is a comparability measure based on 
De Franco et al. [2011], where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings on 
return regressions.  CFCOMP is a similar construct, where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the 
similarity of firm-level earnings on cash flow regressions.  R_(c) indicates the ranked version of our 
measurement c.  The calculation of both metrics is explained in detail in the paper.  Variables are averaged at the 
country, peer country, and industry level.  SMCTRY is a binary variable taking the value of one if country and 
peer country are the same. GAAP_PROX measures the proximity between GAAP regimes, based on the data 
used by Bae et al. [2008].  AUDIT is defined 0/0.5/1 if none/one/both of the compared firms have a dominant 
auditor (KPMG, PWC, Ernst & Young or Deloitte). The estimated models are interacted versions of models (5) 
and (6).  In Panel B, the dependent variable is the change in comparability measures relative to the pre IFRS 
period.  IFRS_EFFECT is the change in GAAP_PROX caused by IFRS adoption.  Robust standard errors 
clustered by country, peer country and industry are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.  p-value total 
IFRS_EFFECT reports the two-sided p-value of a Wald F-test that tests whether the sum of the coefficients for 
IFRS_EFFECT and IFRS_EFFECT*AUDIT is significantly different from zero, effectively testing whether there 
is a significant comparability effect of IFRS adoption for firm-pairs where both firms have dominant auditors.  
***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
Panel A: Comparability Analysis Pre IFRS (N=29,707) 
  Model (5*)   Model (5*)  Model (5*)   Model (5*) 
Dependent Variable DKVCOMP   R_DKVCOMP   CFCOMP   R_CFCOMP 
Intercept -0.186***  -0.727***  -0.123***  -0.678*** 
 (0.035)  (0.095)  (0.047)  (0.088) 
SMCTRY 0.028***  0.051***  0.003  0.029*** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.003)  (0.008) 
GAAP_PROX -0.012  0.003  0.001  0.012 
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.011) 
AUDIT 0.086***  0.066***  0.018***  0.040*** 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.007) 
SMCTRY * AUDIT -0.019*  -0.015  0.000  -0.010 
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.010) 
GAAP_PROX * AUDIT 0.017  0.007  0.007  0.026** 
 (0.012)   (0.014)   (0.004)   (0.013) 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.252  0.160  0.290  0.062 
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Panel B: Comparability Analysis IFRS Effect (N=28,565) 
  Model (6*)   Model (6*)  Model (6*)   Model (6*) 
Dependent Variable DKVCOMP)   R_DKVCOMP)   CFCOMP)   R_CFCOMP) 
Intercept 0.118***  0.267**  0.030  0.096 
 (0.034)  (0.120)  (0.025)  (0.149) 
SMCTRY -0.013  -0.017*  0.001  0.005 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.003)  (0.008) 
IFRS_EFFECT -0.016**  -0.012  -0.006*  -0.002 
 (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.010) 
AUDIT -0.038***  -0.010***  -0.002*  -0.013*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
SMCTRY * AUDIT 0.004  0.000  0.000  -0.003 
 (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.011) 
IFRS_EFFECT * AUDIT 0.020**  0.017  0.010***  0.020* 
 (0.009)   (0.013)   (0.003)   (0.012) 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
p-value total IFRS_EFFECT 0.427  0.481  0.020  0.015 
R2 0.181  0.073  0.070  0.019 
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Comparability Analysis: Moderated by Compliance Incentives 
This Table reports the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting information, 
moderated by incentives for compliance.  DKVCOMP is a comparability measure based on De Franco et al. [2011], 
where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings on return regressions.  
CFCOMP is a similar construct, where firm-to-firm comparability is assessed by the similarity of firm-level earnings 
on cash flow regressions.  R_(c) indicates the ranked version of our measurement c.  The calculation of both metrics 
is explained in detail in the paper.  Variables are averaged at the country, peer country, and industry level.  SMCTRY 
is a binary variable taking the value of one if country and peer country are the same. GAAP_PROX measures the 
proximity between GAAP regimes, based on the data used by Bae et al. [2008].  COMPINC is defined as the sum of 
country-level size quintiles (0-4) for matched firms, where size is measured by lagged market capitalization plus 
0/0.5/1 if none/one/both of the compared firms have a dominant auditor (KPMG, PWC, Ernst & Young or Deloitte).  
COMPINC is scaled to be distributed between 0 and 1.  The estimated models are interacted versions of models (5) 
and (6).  In Panel B, the dependent variable is the change in comparability measures relative to the pre IFRS period.  
IFRS_EFFECT is the change in GAAP_PROX caused by IFRS adoption.  Robust standard errors clustered by 
country, peer country and industry are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.  p-value total IFRS_EFFECT 
reports the two-sided p-value of a Wald F-test that tests whether the sum of the coefficients for IFRS_EFFECT and 
IFRS_EFFECT*AUDIT is significantly different from zero, effectively testing whether there is a significant 
comparability effect of IFRS adoption for firm-pairs within the highest bin of compliance incentives.  ***/**/* 
marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
 
Panel A: Comparability Analysis Pre IFRS (N=66,095) 
  Model (5*)   Model (5*)  Model (5*)   Model (5*) 
Dependent Variable DKVCOMP   R_DKVCOMP   CFCOMP   R_CFCOMP 
Intercept -0.303***  -0.588***  -0.126***  -0.549*** 
 (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
SMCTRY 0.043***  0.053***  0.009**  0.054*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
GAAP_PROX -0.040***  -0.011  -0.007  -0.023** 
 (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.004)  (0.011) 
COMPINC 0.254***  0.197***  0.047***  0.102*** 
 (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.003)  (0.008) 
SMCTRY * COMPINC -0.053***  -0.011  -0.009*  -0.051*** 
 (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.005)  (0.013) 
GAAP_PROX * COMPINC 0.075***  0.024  0.022***  0.094*** 
 (0.015)   (0.019)   (0.006)   (0.016) 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.346  0.203  0.284  0.061 
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TABLE 7 - Continued 
 
Panel B: Comparability Analysis IFRS Effect (N=62,585) 
  Model (6*)   Model (6*)  Model (6*)   Model (6*) 
Dependent Variable DKVCOMP)   R_DKVCOMP)   CFCOMP)   R_CFCOMP) 
Intercept 0.110***  0.030***  -0.021***  0.010 
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
SMCTRY -0.017**  -0.021**  0.001  0.000 
 (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.008) 
IFRS_EFFECT -0.015*  -0.011  -0.009***  -0.011 
 (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.010) 
COMPINC -0.100***  -0.036***  0.003***  -0.005 
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
SMCTRY * COMPINC 0.015  0.003  0.001  0.006 
 (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.004)  (0.013) 
IFRS_EFFECT * COMPINC 0.026**  0.011  0.016***  0.031** 
 (0.012)   (0.016)   (0.004)   (0.015) 
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
p-value total IFRS_EFFECT 0.059   0.935   0.002   0.025 
R2 0.189   0.068   0.062   0.014 
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